



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DIA review(s) completed.

*Noted by DCI. [signature]
Welder*

TS-00273/AP-2

12 NOV 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Request for Special National Intelligence Estimate (U)

1. (TS) The Secretary of Defense has requested that a study be initiated which focuses on the problem of the size of the Strategic Reserve after Phase II buildup in South Vietnam. Preliminary consideration of this problem indicates an urgent requirement for a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE). Considering the importance of determining the size and composition of the Armed Forces during the critical years ahead, and the necessity of making known these requirements to assure that meaningful conventional options are available to the President, it is requested that a SNIE be prepared addressing reactions to a Phase II buildup or to US/Allied success in South Vietnam.

2. (TS) As terms of reference it is requested that this SNIE address two questions:

a. What would be the probable reactions to a Phase II buildup consisting of:

(1) The deployment of an additional Field Force Headquarters to the Third Corps area.

(2) Introduction of 2 more Army Divisions, one additional Marine Division and an Armored Cavalry Regiment (aimed at extending control and releasing ARVN forces for additional operations in South Vietnam).

(3) The deployment of 4 additional Tactical Fighter Squadrons.

(4) Overall force buildup from 219,000 of Phase I to 347,000 of Phase II.

(5) Intensified air strikes against North Vietnam to include the de facto sanctuaries previously observed, airfields, land and water LOC's, POL and SAM sites, and aerial mining of major ports of entry.

b. What would be the probable reactions to US/Allied success in South Vietnam resulting in:

(1) The DRV being forced to cease its direction and support of the Viet Cong insurgency.

(2) The defeat of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

(3) The GVN assuming control over all of South Vietnam.

3. (S) In relation to the above two questions it is requested that judgments be made regarding:

a. Communist China. Considering her prestige involved and her commitment to support revolutionary causes and "movements of national liberation" what CHICOM reactions should be anticipated:

(1) Overt intervention with conventional force? If the CHICOM's decided to attack overtly, how much and what kind of strategic warning would we expect?

(2) Covert intervention or infiltration, for example, in Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma?


(3) Action to divert our attention elsewhere, for example, Korea, Taiwan, Burma or India?

(4) Logistical or other type support to North Vietnam?

b. USSR. What reactions should be anticipated?

c. DRV/NFLSV. What reactions should be anticipated?

d. Free World, particularly France. What reactions should be anticipated?



JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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